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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER, : 
nka CAROLYN BOIES, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
vs. Court of Appeals 87-0500-CA 
: Category 14(b) 
CASS BETTINGER, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
CITATIONS TO TRANSCRIPTS 
There are two transcripts in this matter: a transcript of 
the evidentiary hearing held on March 21, 1987 and a transcript 
of the closing arguments on April 9, 1987, The transcript of the 
evidentiary hearing will be referred to as "March Tr." and the 
transcript of the closing argument will be referred to as "April 
Tr.". Pages and line numbers will be designated by decimals (.) 
so that a reference to page 3, line 11, will appear as 3.11. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 2, 1987, the lower Court issued an Order to Show 
Cause requiring Defendant to appear before the Court on March 24, 
1987, to show cause why certain orders should not be entered with 
respect to visitation and the interpretation of provisions of the 
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Decree of Divorce relating to child support. (R. 303). 
The basis of the Order to Show Cause was an affidavit 
submitted by Defendant (R. 244) wherein Defendant stated, among 
other things, that: 
(a) Plaintiff had refused to allow him visitation with the 
minor children by constantly claiming unavailability of the 
children by reason of prior plans made by Plaintiff; 
(b) Plaintiff had falsely claimed arrearages in child 
support payments and had sought and obtained assistance from the 
Office of Recovery Services who had initiated enforcement 
procedures. At the hearing on the Order to Show Cause, Defendant 
proffered evidence in support of these claims (March Tr. 4.17; 
10.3; 10.15; 10.24 & 11.6). 
The Order to Show Cause further claimed interference in the 
sale of the family home. However, those issues are now moot 
insofar as this appeal is concerned. 
The basis of the dispute with respect to child support 
arrearages was that Plaintiff interpreted paragraphs 7 and 8 of 
the Divorce Decree to provide that in the event of Plaintiff's 
remarriage, Defendant was obligated to continue making the 
mortgage payments on the family and also to simultaneously 
increase child support in a sum equal to two-thirds of the 
mortgage payment. Under Plaintiff's interpretation, which was 
unilaterally conceived and not submitted to the Court for 
approval, Defendant would have been seriously in arrears in child 
support payments in a sum equal to one-third of the monthly 
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mortgage payment since Plaintiff's remarriage in August, 1984. 
With respect to the child support issue, Defendant contended 
that paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Decree provided that in the event 
of Plaintiff's remarriage, Defendant's obligation to make the 
house payment would cease with a simultaneous increase in his 
obligation to pay child support in a sum equal to two-thirds of 
the house payment. 
At the hearing on March 24, 1987, both parties stipulated 
that the relevant facts could be proffered and if there appeared 
to be a dispute in the facts, either party could call witnesses 
to testify (March Tr. 3.13 to 3.20). The proffers were received 
by the Court and both of the parties testified concerning facts 
relating to visitation. 
At the hearing on March 24, 1987, each party had full 
opportunity to present evidence. However, Plaintiff requested 
leave to file a memorandum and such leave was granted. (March Tr. 
19.10). On or about April 2, 1987, nine (9) days after the 
evidentiary hearing, Plaintiff submitted an affidavit rather than 
a memorandum (R. 311). Defendant objected to the untimely 
proffer of additional facts inasmuch as the hearing had been 
concluded and Defendant was unable to file a opposing affidavit 
(April Tr. 7.18). The Court made a decision on the meaning of 
paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Decree without ruling on the objection 
(April Tr. 20.15 to 21.2). 
On April 21, 1987, the Court entered its Order in the matter 
(hereinafter "Subject Order"). A copy of the Subject Order is 
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attached as Exhibit A. 
On April 20, 1987, Plaintiff filed an "Objection to Order, 
Request for Reconsideration and Motion for New Trial (R. 383) 
(hereinafter "Objection, Request and Motion"). More than three 
and one-half months later, on August 14, 1987, Plaintiff filed a 
memorandum in support of the Objection, Request and Motion (R. 
426). A corrected memorandum was submitted on August 17, 1987 
(R. 442). Hearing on the Objection, Request and Motion was held 
on August 31, 1987. The lower court denied the Objection, 
Request and Motion on September 11, 1987 (R. 479). 
At the outset, it is important to note, that very few of the 
issues presented to this Court on appeal were ever mentioned or 
presented to the trial court. For example, the claim that 
Findings and Conclusions should have been entered by the trial 
court was never mentioned at the evidentiary hearing on March 24, 
1987, at the closing argument on April 9, 1987, in the memorandum 
in support of the Objection, Request and Motion or at the hearing 
on the Objection, Request and Motion on August 31, 1987. 
On November 10, 1987, Plaintiff appealed the Orders of April 
21, 1987 and November 10, 1987 to this Court. 
I. 
THE TERMS AND PROVISIONS OF THE SUBJECT ORDER REGARDING 
VISITATION AND INTERPRETATION OF PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE 
DECREE WERE PROPERLY ENTERED 
Under Point I of her brief, Plaintiff asserts that 
paragraphs 1 and 4 of the Subject Order was improperly entered 
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because: (a) Said paragraphs constituted a modification of the 
Decree in violation of Rule 9, Third District Court Rules of 
Practice; and, (b) the Court failed to enter Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law in support of paragraphs 1 and 4 of the 
Subject Order. 
A. Compliance with Rule 9 
The Subject Order was the result of a hearing on an Order to 
Show Cause entered by the Court on March 2, 1987. At that time, 
the present version of Rule 9 upon which Plaintiff relies was not 
in effect. Thus, there was no necessity for filing a petition 
for modification. Assuming for the sake of argument that the 
Subject Order constitutes a modification of the Decree with 
respect to visitation, the Order to Show Cause properly brought 
the issue before the trial court. 
The current version of Rule 9, discussed by Plaintiff in her 
brief, was not in effect until June 1, 1987. Thus, on the date 
that the Order to Show Cause was issued, and on the date of the 
hearing on the Order to Show Cause, a modification did not need 
to comply with the current version of Rule 9 as cited by 
Plaintiff in her brief. 
It is difficult to conceive of how paragraph 1 of the 
Subject Order could be construed as a "modification" of the 
Decree. The Court made a decision to resolve a problem with 
visitation by establishing a detailed visitation schedule to 
avoid "prior plans" claimed by Plaintiff. Moreover, the 
structured visitation schedule is well within the scope of 
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"reasonable visitation". Paragraph 1 of the Subject Order is a 
clarification of an existing Decree rather than a "modification" 
of the Decree. Thus, a finding of changed circumstances was 
unnecessary. Moreover, the interference with Defendant's 
visitation, which has occurred since the date of the Decree, is a 
material change if such a change is necessary. 
Paragraph 4 of the Subject Order, which interprets 
paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Decree, cannot be considered a 
"modification". The Court merely resolved the conflicting 
interpretations. The wording of paragraph 7 of the Decree was 
not changed or modified, it was clarified and construed. 
Paragraph 7 and 8 of the Decree have the same meaning after 
issuance of the Subject Order as they did prior to the issuance 
of the Subject Order. The Court merely rejected Plaintiff's 
interpretation of those paragraphs. 
B. Findings of Fact 
Plaintiff argues that paragraph 1 of the Subject Order 
should be reversed because the lower court did not enter Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
All of Plaintiff's claims that the trial court should have 
entered Findings and/or Conclusions on various issues have been 
waived by Plaintiff inasmuch as such claims were never mentioned 
or argued to the trial court. It is well established that a 
party may not raise issues on appeal that were not presented in 
the lower court. Paffel vs. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986); 
English vs. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977); Lane vs. Messer, 
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732 P.2d 488 (Utah 1986); Bundy vs. Century Equipment Company, 
692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984). 
The entry of Findings and Conclusions in support of 
paragraph 1 of the Subject Order is unnecessary. Anyone 
reviewing the transcript can easily determine the basis of the 
Court's decision. Defendant asserted that Plaintiff was 
unjustifiably denying visitation by claiming that she had made 
prior plans. The obvious solution was to impose a detailed 
visitation schedule so that Plaintiff would have advance notice 
of visitation and thereby cease making prior inconsistent plans. 
The decisions of the Supreme Court hold that there is a 
presumption that the trial court considered all relevant evidence 
when rendering a decision. Paffel vs. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 
1986); Walker vs. Walker, 707 P.2d 110 (Utah 1985). A party 
claiming error by failure of the trial court to enter Findings 
and Conclusions has the burden of rebutting this presumption. 
Ibid. Plaintiff has completely failed to rebut this presumption. 
The case law further holds that if the evidence submitted to 
the Court supports the Court's decision, Findings and Conclusions 
are not required. Paffel vs. Paffel, supra; Walker vs. Walker, 
supra. It is clear that the evidence presented to the trial 
court supported the decision reflected in paragraph 1 of the 
Subject Order. 
The entry of Findings of Fact are unnecessary with respect 
to paragraph 4 of the Subject Order inasmuch as no factual 
determination was involved. Construction of ambiguous wording is 
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a matter of law. Even if it be assumed, for the sake of 
argument, that paragraph 4 of the Subject Order involved a 
determination of fact, the principles noted in the Paffel and 
Walker establish that findings are unnecessary. 
A Conclusion of Law in support of paragraph 4 of the Subject 
Order is unnecessary inasmuch as the Court's decision is readily 
apparent from the Order itself. The only possible Conclusion of 
Law would be a verbatim quotation of the Order. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that Findings and 
Conclusions should have been entered, the remedy is not reversal 
of the Subject Order. The proper remedy would be to remand the 
case to the lower court with instructions to enter Findings and 
Conclusions. In order to obtain a reversal of the order, 
Plaintiff has the burden of proving that there was a 
misunderstanding or a misapplication of the law that resulted in 
substantial and prejudicial error, or that the evidence clearly 
preponderated against the decisions of the Court or that a 
serious inequity resulted so as to manifest a clear abuse of 
discretion. English vs. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977). Mere 
failure to enter Findings or Conclusions does not make the order 
invalid. 
II. 
THE SUBJECT ORDER ACCURATELY STATES THE 
SUBSTANCE OF THE COURT'S RULING 
Plaintiff asserts that paragraphs 1(b), (d), (e), (f), (g) 
and (h) do not accurately reflect the substance of the Court's 
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oral decision in the matter. 
In this regard, paragraph 1(b) is supported by the record. 
(April Tr. 6.22). Paragraphs 1(a), (c), (e) and (g) are 
supported by the record (March Tr. 27.1). Although paragraph 
1(g) is admittedly different than the Court's oral decision, 
paragraph 1(g) specifies less visitation than the Court ordered 
so that Plaintiff has no cause to complain. 
The gravamen of Plaintiff's complaint relates to visitation 
of the father on Father's Day (paragraph 1(d)), visitation for 
two (2) hours on Christmas Day in even numbered years (paragraph 
1(f)) and visitation for two (2) hours on the child's birthday 
(paragraph 1(h)). 
It is important to note that at the time the closing 
arguments were presented to the Court on April 9, 1987, a draft 
of the Subject Order containing the detailed visitation schedule 
was in the hands of Plaintiff's attorney (April Tr. 11.15 & 
17.5). The draft contained the exact language of the final Order 
except as to additional items discussed at the hearing (April Tr. 
21.3 & 17.9). 
During that hearing, Plaintiff's attorney noted all of the 
problems with respect to the proposed Order (April Tr. 17). The 
items of which Plaintiff now complains were not mentioned (April 
Tr. 17-18). Thus, Plaintiff has waived the objections. Paffel 
vs. Paffel, supra; English vs. English, supra; Lane vs. Messer, 
supra; Bundy vs. Century Equipment Company, supra. 
Even if the objections had not been waived, the items of 
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which Plaintiff complains are fair and reasonable. Moreover, it 
must be presumed, unless there is evidence to the contrary, that 
Judge Young read the Subject Order at the time it was signed and 
approved of the items of which Plaintiff now complains. See 
Paffel vs. Paffel, supra; Walker vs. Walker, supra. 
With respect to the Christmas visitation (paragraph 1(f)), 
Plaintiff's standing to complain is questionable. The visitation 
specified in the Order is much less than orally directed by the 
Court (March Tr. 27). 
III. 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEB 
Plaintiff asserts that the award of attorneys fees should be 
reversed because there was no evidence that the fees were 
reasonable. This issue, like many other issues raised by 
Plaintiff in this appeal, is raised for the first time before 
this Court. During the course of the March evidentiary hearing, 
Plaintiff made no suggestion of any issue of reasonableness of 
fees. 
The evidence on attorneys fees was submitted to the Court in 
the form of an exhibit which was marked as Exhibit 7-D (March Tr. 
10-12). At that the conclusion of the hearing, Plaintiff made no 
objection with respect to the admission of Exhibit 7-D. In this 
regard, note the following quotation from page 32 of the March 
Transcript: 
"Judge Young:...Let me ask, before we go 
formally into recess, we did not enter the 
exhibits. Do you wish them to be 
10 
Mr. McDonald: I would offer them into 
evidence, your Honor. 
Judge Young: Any objection to those 
exhibits? 
Ms. Corporon: I still haven't had an 
opportunity to look at them, your Honor. I 
assume they are summary exhibits of his 
testimony. I don't have any objection, your 
Honor. 
Judge Young: They will be received. 
(Where upon, Defendant's Exhibits 1-8 were 
offered and received into evidence.) (March 
Tr. 32). 
It should further be noted that the issue of reasonableness 
of the fees is irrelevant inasmuch as only a fraction of the fees 
were awarded. Exhibit 7-D established fees incurred by Defendant 
in the sum of $3,340.75. The total award of attorneys fees was 
only $500.00. 
At no time during the hearing did Plaintiff question the 
reasonableness of the attorneys fees noted in Exhibit 7-D. 
IV. 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE INTERPRETATION OF PARAGRAPHS 7 AND 8 
OF THE ORIGINAL DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Plaintiff contends that the Court committed error in 
interpreting the provisions of paragraphs 7 and 8 of the original 
Decree. 
Plaintiff's argument is based upon three totally unfounded 
assumptions: (a) the Court ignored the rules of construction 
established in various Supreme Court cases; (b) the Court was 
unable to ascertain the intent of the parties from the wording of 
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the Decree; (c) the Court relied on extrinsic evidence to 
determine the intent of the parties. 
It is apparent that the Court closely followed the rules of 
construction as set forth in Utah Valley Bank vs. Tanner, 636 
P.2d 1060 (Utah 1981). That rule of construction requires that 
the Court first attempt to ascertain the intent of the parties 
from the wording of the instrument. It is only when the intent 
cannot be determined from the wording of the instrument that the 
Court turns to extrinsic evidence. 
It makes no difference whether the Court determined the 
intent of the parties from the wording of the Decree or from 
evidence proffered by the parties. In either event, the result 
is the same. 
A. Determination of Intent From Wording of Decree 
The intent of the parties is apparent from an analysis of 
the wording of paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Decree. The wording of 
paragraphs 7 and 8 is as follows: 
"7. Plaintiff is awarded the real property 
of the marriage in the form of a home located 
at 2740 East 4510 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, subject to a lien thereon for one-half 
of the equity that may be in the house at the 
time of liquidation (which contemplates an 
increasing equity as the value increases). 
The equity is defined as the fair market 
value or sales price at the time Defendant 
becomes entitled to liquidate his lien as set 
forth herein, less the amount of mortgages, 
costs of improvements made by Plaintiff and 
costs of sale. This lien shall not be 
forecloseable until the youngest child 
reaches 18, or until the home is sold or 
until Plaintiff remarries. On the occurrence 
of any of these events, two-thirds of the 
house payments then made shall be converted 
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to child support an that sum shall be paid to 
the Plaintiff on a monthly basis as 
additional child support• 
8, Defendant is ordered to continue making 
the payments on the home. Defendant shall 
also be entitled to take the entire interest 
portion of the house payment as a deduction 
for himself as well as three (3) income tax 
exemptions on the children with Plaintiff to 
receive one exemption on the youngest child 
at the present time." (Emphasis added). 
Plaintiff remarried in August, 1984 (March Tr. 15.10). 
Thereafter, she and her new husband resided in the former marital 
domicile for approximately one year (March Tr. 15.14) and then 
arranged for tenants to occupy the home (March Tr. 15.19). 
Plaintiff contends that paragraph 7 means that upon her 
remarriage or sale of the family home, Defendants obligations 
for support increase because Defendant must continue making 
mortgage payments on the home where she and her new husband 
resided (an impossibility if the home is sold) and Defendant must 
also increase child support payments in an amount equal to two-
thirds of the mortgage payment. 
Defendant contends that paragraph 7 means upon Plaintiff's 
remarriage or upon sale of the home, his obligations decrease in 
that he no longer is obligated to make the mortgage payment, but 
pays a greater amount of child support in a sum equal to two-
thirds of the mortgage payment (adjusted for children reaching 
the age of majority and children who thereafter reside with 
Defendant). 
An analysis of the wording of the Decree in the 
circumstances under which the underlying contract was negotiated, 
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clearly demonstrates that Defendant interpretation is correct* 
The parties could not have intended the interpretation 
asserted by Plaintiff. Under Plaintiff's contention, when the 
home is sold (an event in the same category as her remarriage), 
Defendant must continue to make the mortgage payment. Obviously, 
such an interpretation cannot stand inasmuch as after a sale of 
the home, there would be no mortgage payment. Thus, it is 
apparent that the parties intended that upon the occurrence of 
any one of the events in paragraph 7 such as Plaintiff's 
remarriage or the sale of the home, Defendant's obligation to 
make the mortgage payment would cease and his child support 
obligations would increase in an amount equal to two-thirds of 
the mortgage payment previously made. 
It is common knowledge that when a divorced woman remarries 
she thereby obtains an additional source of support through the 
earning capacity of her new husband. Such an obvious fact was 
apparent to parties at the time they negotiated the agreement 
underlying the Decree. In such a circumstance, it would be 
logical to assume that any adjustment conditional upon remarriage 
would result in a decrease of support rather than an increase. 
At that the time the parties negotiated the contract 
underlying the Decree, it would be ludicrous to assume that: 
Defendant intended to provide a residence for Plaintiff's nev; 
husband in the event of remarriage. Thus, it is logical to 
conclude that when a divorce decree dictates a change upon 
remarriage of the wife, the parties did not intend that the 
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former husband would pay for the residence of the new husband. 
In construing the Decree, words should be given their 
logical meaning. In this regard, Defendant calls the Court's 
attention to the word "converted". According to Webster's New 
Collegiate Dictionary, 1974 edition, the word "converted" means 
"...to change from one form to another" and "...to exchange for 
an equivalent". On the basis of this definition, if two-thirds 
of the house payment is "converted" to child support, there can 
no longer be a house payment. 
Any logical view of the situation would demand the 
construction placed upon paragraphs 7 and 8 by the Court. It is 
apparent that the parties, in the face of Plaintiff's remarriage, 
were making adjustments for the pre-marriage tax consequences. 
If Plaintiff is making the mortgage payments, he is entitled to a 
deduction for the portion attributable to interest. At or about 
the time that the underlying contract was negotiated, Plaintiff 
was receiving a tax benefit equal to approximately one-third of 
the mortgage payment. It is apparent that the parties intended 
the conversion from house payment to child support to equalize 
the after tax impact on Defendant. 
B. Determination of Intent from Extrinsic Evidence 
Even if it be assumed, for the sake of argument, that the 
lower Court turned to extrinsic evidence to construe paragraphs 7 
and 8 of the Decree, the Court was not bound to accept the self-
serving statements of Plaintiff especially when such statements 
are totally outside the realm of reason and contradicted by 
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Defendant's evidence. Plaintiff contended that Defendant agreed 
to continue to make the house payment so as to benefit from a 
"real estate investment". Obviously, no person would consent to 
an "investment" whereby such person would pay the entire cost and 
receive half of the value. 
Defendant proffered evidence contrary to the evidence that 
was untimely submitted by Plaintiff in her affidavit filed after 
the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing. Defendant proffered 
that the negotiations leading up to the agreement upon which the 
Decree was based centered upon the proposition that upon 
Plaintiff's remarriage Defendant's overall obligation would 
decrease in an amount equal to one-third of the house payment 
(March Tr. 4.25); that Defendant did not intend to provide 
support to Plaintiff's new husband (March Tr. 5.11); and, that 
since Defendant had a substantial investment in the home, he 
would continue to make the house payment as a credit against 
child support (March Tr. 6.10). Had it not been for the untimely 
proffer evidence by Plaintiff, Defendant would have proffered 
additional evidence of intent (See April Tr. 7-8). However, the 
evidence that was proffered by Defendant clearly supports the 
decision of the lower court. 
With respect to Plaintiff's claim of error in failing to 
enter Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Defendant 
incorporates by reference his arguments set forth in Section I of 
this brief. 
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CONCLUSION 
The majority of points raised by Plaintiff in her brief are 
raised for the first time on appeal. The few issues that were 
submitted to the trial court were properly determined. Plaintiff 
has totally failed to demonstrate a basis for reversal on any 
issue raised in her brief, i.e., that there was a 
misunderstanding or a misapplication of the law resulting in 
substantial and prejudicial error, or that the decision was 
clearly against the preponderance of the evidence or that a 
serious inequity resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of 
discretion. English vs. English, supra. On these grounds, 
Defendant submits that the Subject Order should be affirmed in 
its entirety. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of June, 1988. 
MCDONALD & BULLEN: 
Robert M. McDonald 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the <^ /^> day of June, 1988, I 
served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Respondentf s 
Brief upon the following named persons by depositing said 
document in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as 
follows: 
Craig M, Peterson 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
H 
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Robert M. McDonald, (#2175) 
Attorney for Defendant Q ^J^C ' 
American Plaza III ~ " 
47 West 200 South, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 359-0999 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH £0O dob I 
oooOooo
 t205/<2' Vf-f 
ORDER 
Civil No. D-80-931 
&k?2/ 3 /JJ- 76 V 
n «i w ^ 
CAROLYN JOYCE BETTINGER, 
Plaintiff/ 
-vs-
CASS BETTINGER, 
Defendant. 
oooOooo 
The issues raised by the Order to Show Cause heretofore 
issued by the Court, was heard before the Honorable David Young, 
District Judge, on Tuesday, March 24, 1987. Present at said 
hearing were Robert M. McDonald representing defendant and Mary 
Corporon representing plaintiff. The Court having heard the 
testimony and proffers submitted by the respective parties, and 
having heard the arguments of counsel, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendant shall have the right to visit the child born 
of the marriage, Nicole, age 10, at the following times: 
(a) Every other weekend beginning on Friday 
evening at 5:00 p.m. and ending Sunday evening at 
6:00 p.m.; 
1 
(b) Visitation on one weekday for a period of 
three hours during those weeks when there is no weekend 
visitation and said visitation shall take place on 
Wednesday of such week unless defendant designates 
a different date on or before Sunday of said week; 
(c) Summer vacation visitation for a period of 
six weeks during the months of June, July and August of 
each calendar year the dates to be designated by 
defendant; 
(d) Visitation on every Father's Day for a period 
of six hours designated by defendant; 
(e) During even numbered calendar years holiday 
visitation for eight hours to be designated by 
defendant on New Year's Day, Easter, Independence 
Day, Labor Day and Thanksgiving and in odd numbered 
calendar years on President's Day, Memorial Day, 
Pioneer Day, Veterans Day and Christmas Day; 
(f) During odd numbered calendar years when 
defendant does not have visitation for the entire 
Christmas Day, defendant shall have visitation for a 
period of two hours on Christmas Day; 
(g) Visitation for an entire day during the 
child's Christmas holiday, the date to be designated by 
defendant; 
(h) Visitation for two hours on the child's 
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birthday. 
Defendant shall notify plaintiff on or before the Thursday prior 
to weekend visitation if defendant will be unable to exercise 
such weekend visitation, 
2. Plaintiff shall not in any manner, directly or 
indirectly, impair plaintiff from making telephone contact with 
the minor child, Nicole. Plaintiff shall use her best efforts to 
facilitate and encourage telephone contact between defendant and 
said child. 
3. Control of the former family home located at 2740 East 
4510 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, shall forthwith be transferred 
to defendant. In this regard, plaintiff shall immediately 
deliver to defendant keys to all locks in the home and keys to 
all locks on appurtenant structures and a copy of the most recent 
listing agreement. Thereafter, defendant shall have full and 
exclusive authority to: (a) negotiate, execute, amend, or 
terminate listing agreements with respect to the home; (b) 
supervise and control any activity or arrangement deemed 
necessary by defendant to facilitate the sale of the home; (c) 
negotiate, arrange or terminate any interim rental agreement with 
respect to the home; (d) make any arrangement, improvement or 
repair which defendant feels will facilitate sale of the home to 
be paid from the proceeds of sale of the house. Provided, 
however, that the home shall not be sold except at a price and 
upon terms acceptable to both parties. In the event the parties 
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cannot agree as to the selling price or terms of sale, the matter 
shall be submitted to the Court. 
4. Paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce heretofore entered 
in this action is construed as follows: upon plaintiff's 
remarriage, defendant is relieved from any further obligation to 
make the monthly installment payments on the mortgage on the 
family home, but defendant's obligation for child support shall 
be increased in a sum equal to two-thirds of the monthly mortgage 
payment* By reason of defendant's equity in said home, defendant 
shall have the option to make the monthly installment payment on 
the family home and shall receive full credit against his child 
support obligations. 
5. The judgment heretofore entered by the Court on or 
about March 24, 1986, in the principal sum of $2,705.50 is hereby 
vacated and set aside. 
6. The Court finds that defendant is current with respect 
to all obligations for child support up to and including March 
31, 1987. 
7. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of defendant and 
against plaintiff in the sum of $500.00 representing a portion of 
the costs and attorney's fees incurred by defendant in obtaining 
this Order. 
8. Inasmuch as plaintiff has paid and discharged the 
orthodontic bill, the dispute relating thereto has been 
resolved. 
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DATED th is $r day of April, 1987. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Qtmk 
I hereby certify that on the 
**pm*Ctark 
day of April, 1987, I 
served a true and accurate copy of an Order upon plaintiff by 
depositing said copy in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed to the following: 
Mary C. Corporon 
Attorney at Law 
Corporon & Williams 
1100 Boston Building 
Salt Lake CiJ-yV Ut>h 84111 
s 
5 
